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ABSTRACT Available evidence demonstrates that direct patient contact and contact with infectious body fluids are the pri-
mary modes for Ebola virus transmission, but this is based on a limited number of studies. Key areas requiring further
study include (i) the role of aerosol transmission (either via large droplets or small particles in the vicinity of source pa-
tients), (ii) the role of environmental contamination and fomite transmission, (iii) the degree to which minimally or mildly
ill persons transmit infection, (iv) how long clinically relevant infectiousness persists, (v) the role that “superspreading
events” may play in driving transmission dynamics, (vi) whether strain differences or repeated serial passage in outbreak
settings can impact virus transmission, and (vii) what role sylvatic or domestic animals could play in outbreak propaga-
tion, particularly during major epidemics such as the 2013–2015 West Africa situation. In this review, we address what we
know and what we do not know about Ebola virus transmission. We also hypothesize that Ebola viruses have the potential
to be respiratory pathogens with primary respiratory spread.
PAST EBOLA OUTBREAKS
Between the first recognized outbreak of Ebola virus disease(EVD) in 1976 and the onset of the 2013–2015 Ebola epidemic
in West Africa, 24 outbreaks of EVD involving approximately
2,400 reported cases had been recognized by the World Health
Organization (WHO) (1). One additional outbreak involving 69
cases occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
between July and October 2014 (2). To date, five species of Ebola
viruses have been identified; four from Africa (Zaire, Sudan,
Bundibugyo, and Tai Forest) and one from the Philippines (Res-
ton) (1, 3, 4).Most pre-2013 outbreakswere caused byZaire Ebola
virus (EBOV) (14 outbreaks) or Sudan virus (SUDV) (7 out-
breaks); Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) caused two outbreaks, andTai
Forest virus (TAFV) was identified in a single case from Côte
d’Ivoire (1). Outbreaks caused by Reston virus (RESTV) have oc-
curred in nonhuman primates and pigs, with associated asymp-
tomatic human infections (5).
Only seven outbreaks involved more than 100 reported
cases. The maximum number of generations of human-to-
human transmission for these outbreaks is unknown but is
likely relatively low. One report estimated 15 generations of
viral transmission during a 1976 SUDV outbreak (284 cases),
which was the most that were identified (6). Investigators re-
corded four generations of spread during the EBOV outbreak
in Kikwit, DRC (315 cases) (7).
Many experts have concluded that the extensive transmis-
sion documented in the 2013–2015West Africa epidemic is due
to societal factors (poverty, urban density, population migra-
tion patterns, and poor health care and public health infra-
structure) rather than unique biological characteristics of the
agent (8, 9). Limited data are available, however, regarding
virus genomics (affecting phenotype/pathotype), patient viral
loads, and certain epidemiological features for this unique
EBOV strain. Furthermore, information about Ebola virus
transmission in humans remains incomplete, given the rela-
tively small number of outbreak investigations and cases rec-
ognized before 2013; as a result, additional questions remain
(10). In this review, we explore what we know—and what we do
not know—about Ebola virus transmission.
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT EBOLA VIRUS TRANSMISSION IN
HUMANS
Past outbreaks provide opportunities to examine human-to-
human transmission of Ebola viruses. Spread within hospitals
has been documented repeatedly, and outbreak amplification
has occurred in health care settings for both EBOV and SUDV
(6, 7, 11). Early outbreak investigations demonstrated the im-
portance of parenteral transmission via nonsterile needles, al-
though this has not been noted more recently (6, 11). In addi-
tion, investigators have shown that health care workers are at
particularly high risk (6, 7, 11, 12). Use of barrier protection
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and surgical masks apparently was adequate to halt most nos-
ocomial transmission during past outbreaks of EBOV and
SUDV (6, 7, 11, 13–15). In one outbreak of SUDV, however, 14
(64%) of 22 health care workers became infected after barrier
precautions were established; this led to reinforcement of in-
fection control practices (16).
Three reports (the first two involving SUDV and the third
involving EBOV) examined the risk of illness among house-
hold contacts by history of direct physical contact with a pri-
mary case (Table 1) (17–19). In the first report, infection did
not occur in any of 23 familial contacts who had been in the
same room but did not have direct contact with the primary
case; the authors therefore postulated that the virus is not easily
transmitted by the airborne route (17). In the second study,
investigators found that direct contact with body fluids of ill
patients conferred the greatest risk; however, sleeping in the
same hut and sleeping on the same mat were independent risk
factors, suggesting that other modes of transmission played a
role (18). In the third study, the authors indicated that while
they found no evidence of “small-particle aerosol transmis-
sion,” based on confidence limits of their findings, they esti-
mated the upper limit of risk in their study for this mode of
transmission was no more than 4% (19).
In a fourth report involving an outbreak of EBOV, investiga-
tors identified 55 patients out of 316 outbreak-associated cases
who had no reported source of exposure during initial investiga-
tion. They obtained further information directly from four survi-
vors and via surrogates for 40 deceased patients (20). Of 23 for
whom exposure to a suspected EVD case was subsequently iden-
tified, 19 had visited the primary case before becoming ill; 14 had
merely touched the case (without apparent body fluid exposure),
and five reported no physical contact or body fluid exposure. The
authors stated that touch alone may result in transmission and
postulated that “large droplets, aerosolized particles, or fomites”
may have explained the mode of transmission for the five without
reported physical contact.
Available data indicate that direct physical contact and ex-
posure to infected body fluids are the primary modes of Ebola
virus transmission. In support of this, Ebola virus has been
cultured from saliva, breast milk, urine, and semen of infected
patients; in addition, viral RNA (identified by reverse
transcription-PCR [RT-PCR]) has been found in stool, tears,
and sweat and in rectal, conjunctival, vaginal, and skin swabs
(21–25). Because copious amounts of virus can be found in
skin (by direct visualization and immunohistochemistry stain-
ing), and sweat may contain the virus, touching an infected
person may result in transmission (26, 27). Infected persons
can shed virus for prolonged periods of time after infection
(several weeks to months). The virus has been cultured from
semen up to 82 days after illness onset (25), but sexual trans-
mission has not been documented (28).
Fomite transmission apparently can occur, but the role of fo-
mites also appears to be relatively small, based on limited epide-
miological data. In support of fomite transmission, studies dem-
onstrate that filoviruses can survive on solid surfaces and in
liquids for several days to several weeks (29–31). One field study
analyzed 31 environmental samples obtained from an Ebola iso-
lation ward during an SUDV outbreak; all were negative by RT-
PCR and culture, but two control samples (taken from a blood-
stained glove and an intravenous insertion site) were positive for
viral RNA by RT-PCR (21). This study did not demonstrate sig-
nificant environmental contamination; however, sampling took
place after routine cleaning of the ward, methods used had not
been validated for environmental sampling, and the findings are
not generalizable to situations where greater environmental con-
tamination is present. For example, environmental sampling in
2014 at the Ebola treatment center in Kailahun, Sierra Leone,
demonstrated multiple positive samples by RT-PCR. Samples
were collected early in the morning before daily cleaning and dis-
infection, andmanywere taken from surfaces that were not visibly
bloody or soiled. Interestingly, the outer surfaces of three out of 16
masks worn by health care workers were RT-PCR positive; they
were not visibly bloody or soiled (J. Strong, unpublished data).
Identification of viral RNA on masks suggests either the presence of
aerosols in the patient-care environment or cross-contamination of
the masks (such as when workers doffed personal protective equip-
ment [PPE]). Finding viral RNA in the environment, however,
does not necessarily indicate that viable infectious viral particles
are present.
Since the overwhelming majority of EVD cases have resulted
from prior contact with a symptomatic Ebola patient, public
health authorities have concluded that transmission does not oc-
cur from persons who are incubating disease but not yet symp-
tomatic. Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) testing of
close contacts of clinical cases found that contacts can develop
asymptomatic infection (demonstrated by IgM and IgG re-
sponses) and they harbor very low levels of circulating virus, sug-
gesting that infected persons without symptoms are not very in-
fectious and, therefore, are unlikely to transmit to others (32).
This is probably also true for persons in the presymptomatic phase
of illness. Investigators have noted, however, that mildly ill pa-
tients who are early in the clinical course can transmit infection
(19). Similarly, many secondary cases in past outbreaks had on-
going exposure to a primary household case, so it is not possible to
determine when transmission actually occurred. Finally, for at
least one secondary case, identified during an EBOVoutbreak, the
TABLE 1 Risk of illness among household contacts by history of direct
physical contact with a primary case
Study and contact
status
Development of EVD
No. who became
ill (% of total ill)
No. who were not ill
(% of total not ill) Total
Dowell et al. (19)
Direct contact 28 (100) 67 (46) 95
No direct contact 0 (0) 78 (54) 78
Total 28 145 173
Baron et al. (17)
Direct contact 27 (93) 59 (57) 86
No direct contact 2a (7) 44 (43) 46
Total 29 103 132
Francesconi et al. (18)
Direct contact 26 (96) 47 (80) 73
No direct contact 1b (4) 12 (20) 13
Total 27 59 86
Summation
Direct contact 81 (96) 173 (56) 254
No direct contact 3 (4) 134 (44) 137
Total 84 307 391
a Contact status unknown.
b The patient had probable fomite exposure, i.e., used a blanket that the primary case
had used before death.
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only recognized potential source of exposure was transmission
from an asymptomatic person 2 days before that person became ill
(11), but such reports are exceedingly rare in the available litera-
ture. Even though mildly ill persons can possibly transmit the
virus, review of available data suggests that, if this occurs, it is an
infrequent event and not of substantial epidemiological impor-
tance.
Several additional observations are germane to understanding
human-to-human Ebola virus transmission. First, the amount of
virus in the blood increases substantially over the course of illness;
this likely influences the degree of viral shedding, which, in turn,
influences patient infectiousness over time (18, 19, 33). Second,
patients in the late stages of disease who are at their most infec-
tious and who are experiencing severe diarrhea, vomiting, bleed-
ing, or coughing may be more likely to shed infectious virus with
aerosol particles of various sizes, given the presence of virus in
various body fluids. Third, investigators have raised the possibility
of “superspreading events.” In one report, a single SUDV case
apparently transmitted the virus to 10 familymembers; additional
details regarding this case are not available (34). Investigation of
an EBOVoutbreak found that one case was an apparent source for
38 secondary cases and another was a source for 21 secondary
cases; both had gastrointestinal hemorrhaging, and exposures
most likely occurred during primary-case burials (7). In Sierra
Leone, more than 300 cases were linked to the burial of a patient
who died in May 2014 (35). Fourth, the infectious dose for Ebola
viruses in humans appears to be extremely low, with 10 or fewer
viral particles being sufficient for infection (36). This may be par-
ticularly important for health care workers when doffing contam-
inated PPE, since without meticulous care during doffing, health
care workers may come into contact with small numbers of viral
particles.
Limited information regarding transmission is available for the
current West Africa epidemic. One dramatic feature is the large
number of infected health care workers (37). The WHO has pos-
tulated that inadequate training in specialty care, shortages of
medical staff, shortages of PPE, improper use of PPE, and misdi-
agnosis of EVD have contributed to this occurrence. The exact
transmission mechanism remains unknown for two American
nurses who acquired infection while caring for a patient in Dallas,
TX, and for a nurse in Madrid, Spain, who cared for a returning
missionary (38, 39). For the Dallas patient, aerosol-generating
procedures (such as intubation) were performed before his death,
but it is not clear if these contributed to transmission to the health
care workers.
EBOLA VIRUS TRANSMISSION AT THE HUMAN-ANIMAL
INTERFACE
Ebola viruses can infect a number of animal species, most notably
nonhuman primates. In 1994, an Ebola outbreak occurred among
chimpanzees in the Tai National Park, Côte d’Ivoire (40). An
ethologist was infected with TAFV while conducting a necropsy
on a wild chimpanzee that had been found dead; she was wearing
“household gloves” but no mask or gown (41).
Between 2001 and 2003, several human outbreaks of EBOV
occurred in Gabon and the neighboring Republic of the Congo.
These outbreaks began with index cases handling infected wild
animal carcasses, including gorillas, chimpanzees, duikers (small
antelopes), and possiblymonkeys (42, 43). Investigation of a 2007
EBOV outbreak suggested that fruit bats migrating up the Lulua
River in the DRC were the source; before illness onset, the index
case had bought freshly killed bats for food (44). Since Ebola IgG
antibodies and viral RNA have been detected in bats, researchers
believe that fruit bats may be a primary natural reservoir for Ebola
viruses (45).
Several outbreaks of RESTV occurred between 1989 and 1996
in captive monkeys in the Philippines or imported from the Phil-
ippines into the United States or Italy (3, 46, 47). During the first
outbreak, fourU.S. animal workers seroconverted to positivity for
RESTV; none developed symptoms. One likely became infected
during necropsy on amonkey. For the remaining three, investiga-
tors suggested that direct contact with infected monkeys was the
most likely route; conjunctival exposure and inhalation were con-
sidered possible routes. A WHO report published in 2009 indi-
cated that an additional five monkey handlers in the Philippines
tested positive for IgG antibodies to RESTV; none recalled a sig-
nificant illness (48).
In 2008, RESTV was isolated from pigs in the Philippines (by
RT-PCR and viral isolation). At the time, an increase in mortality
was occurring on swine farms; the pigs were infected with porcine
reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) virus, and some
had evidence of coinfection with RESTV (5). Six workers in con-
tact with infected pigs hadRESTV IgG antibodies, supporting past
infection, which suggests that pigs can transmit RESTV to hu-
mans. Themost likely routes of transmission frompigs to humans
include direct contact with body fluids of infected animals and
possibly respiratory transmission (48). Coinfection of pigs with
PRRS, which causes respiratory disease, may have facilitated re-
spiratory transmission of RESTV (49).
Serologic evidence suggests that dogs can be naturally infected
with Ebola viruses. During one outbreak, investigators found an
EBOV IgG seroprevalence rate of 31.8% by ELISA testing among
dogs fromAfrican villages with both infected animal carcasses and
human EVD cases (50). Ebola-like illness has not been reported in
dogs, EBOV has not been isolated from dogs, and the validity of
the ELISA has been questioned; therefore, the significance of this
finding, particularly with regard to transmission to humans, re-
mains unknown.
ANIMAL TRANSMISSION STUDIES
Several experimental studies have examined animal-to-animal
Ebola virus transmission in various animal species. One study
involving EBOV-inoculated rhesus monkeys and controls found
that two of three control monkeys caged in the same room devel-
oped Ebola disease 10 and 11 days after the inoculated animals had
died; the control monkeys were housed approximately 3 m from
the inoculated monkeys (51). The authors postulated the control
monkeys became infected through aerosol, oral, or conjunctival
exposure to virus-laden droplets. The pattern of pulmonary anti-
gen staining on pathology specimens suggested aerosol infection.
Alternatively, transmission could have occurred through certain
behaviors of caged nonhuman primates (such as spitting and
throwing feces) (52) or through routine animal husbandry. In
another study, six piglets were infected with EBOV and then
housed with four caged macaques (53). The piglets andmacaques
were separated by a wire barrier 20 cm in front of the monkey
cages. All macaques developed infection. Transmission could
have resulted from inhalation of aerosols, inoculation of mucous
membranes by droplets, or droplets landing in the cages with sub-
sequent fomite transmission; animal workers took care to avoid
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cross-contamination of the cages during husbandry practices, but
this remains a possibility (53). In a third study, two monkeys in-
fected with EBOV intramuscularly were placed next to two non-
infected monkeys—both were in open-barred cages without pro-
tective barriers. At 6 days postinoculation, infected monkeys had
high titers of virus in blood, but testing of oral, nasal, and rectal
swabs did not yield infectious virus. The infectedmonkeys did not
transmit virus to uninfected monkeys (54).
Other studies have examined the role of mucosal or inhala-
tional exposures in transmission. In one, researchers inocu-
lated rhesus monkeys with EBOV orally, conjunctivally, or by
intramuscular inoculation (one positive-control monkey)
(55). Three of four monkeys exposed by the oral route, four of
four monkeys exposed by the conjunctival route, and the
positive-control monkey became infected with EBOV and died.
In another, six rhesus monkeys were randomly assigned to one
of three groups of two animals each: low inhaled dose, high
inhaled dose, and noninfectious aerosol (control group). All
EBOV-exposed monkeys developed a rapidly fatal illness (56).
Investigators have shown that pigs develop a severe respiratory
illness following mucosal inoculation with EBOV and can shed
large quantities of virus from the oronasal mucosa (57). In
these studies, the inoculum was suspended in a uniform carrier
and delivered directly to the animals for a certain period of
time in a controlled environment; therefore, this information
is not necessarily applicable to human-to-human transmission
under real-world conditions.
KEY PATHOLOGY FINDINGS IN HUMANS AND NONHUMAN
PRIMATES
Clinical pathology studies of EVD in humans are limited because
of biosafety concerns and lack of medical infrastructure in areas
with Ebola outbreaks. To date, autopsies have been performed
for only about 30 cases of filovirus infection; Ebola outbreaks in
1976 (SUDV) and 1995 (EBOV) remain the primary sources of
information (27, 58, 59). Pathology data demonstrate that
Ebola viruses can infect numerous cell types (primarily macro-
phages and dendritic, endothelial, and Kupffer cells) and tis-
sues (notably liver, spleen, kidneys, lymph nodes, testes, gas-
trointestinal mucosa, and skin). Ebola virus is not known to
cause pneumonitis in humans, although congestion, focal
intra-alveolar edema, diffuse alveolar damage, and hemor-
rhage can occur in the lungs. Viral inclusions can be found
within alveolar macrophages, and free viral particles can be
seen within alveolar spaces (59).
Pathology findings in nonhuman primates are consistent with
data from human autopsies. Of particular interest are studies in-
volving virus inoculation by aerosol challenge. One study demon-
strated that monkeys infected with EBOV by the aerosol route
developed a rapidly fatal Ebola-like illness and on necropsy had
mild to moderate, patchy interstitial pneumonia with a bron-
chocentric pattern (56). Severe lymphoid depletion, necrosis, vas-
culitis, thrombosis, and hemorrhage were noted in tracheobron-
chial lymph nodes. Large amounts of viral antigen were present in
secretions on mucosal surfaces of the airways, oropharynx, and
nose. Another EBOV aerosol challenge study involving rhesus
macaques demonstrated significant primary infection of lym-
phoid tissues in the upper and lower respiratory tract, which is
generally not noted in primates inoculated by other routes (60). A
study involving probable aerosol transmission of EBOV from pig-
lets to cynomolgus macaques showed interstitial pneumonia and
focal areas of alveolar hemorrhage and edema in the macaques.
Viral antigen was detected in alveolar and septal macrophages,
pneumocytes, and pulmonary, bronchiolar, and tracheal epithe-
lial cells (53). In another study, eight guinea pigs were exposed to
an aerosol containing a guinea pig-adapted EBOV strain; all de-
veloped a lethal interstitial pneumonia that was distinct from pul-
monary pathology observed in guinea pigs challenged subcutane-
ously (61). Another study showed that guinea pigs inoculated
intranasally had extensive lung pathology and EBOV antigen in
the trachea, suggesting that guinea pigs challenged intranasally
weremore infectious for naive cagemates than animals inoculated
intraperitoneally (62).
GENOMICS OF EBOLA VIRUS
Since initial isolation of Ebola viruses in 1976, the glycoprotein
gene has remained stable enough to be useful for diagnostics and
phylogenetic analysis (63). Before the West Africa epidemic,
GenBank included 48 completed genomic sequences covering the
five Ebola viruses (64). Eighty-one additional genomic sequences
have been added since the 2013–2015 epidemic in West Africa
began (65). Seventy-eight are from Sierra Leone (collected in late
May tomid-June 2014) (65) and three are fromGuinea (collected
in late February to mid-March 2014) (64). Data from these se-
quences suggest that the current outbreak can be traced to two
distinct introductions from Guinea into Sierra Leone, the Guinea
outbreak was the result of a single zoonotic event, and this EBOV
strain represents a unique clade (64, 65). Two phylodynamic anal-
yses of the Sierra Leone data using several differentmodels suggest
that superspreading events (as evidenced by high variance in
transmission rates in the best-fitting models) are occurring and
driving transmission (66, 67).
THE COMPLEXITIES OF AEROSOLS AND DROPLETS: A
CHANGING PARADIGM
Public health officials generally consider disease transmission of
infectious agents to fall into three categories—contact transmis-
sion (direct and indirect), droplet transmission, and airborne
transmission; the definition of each follows (68). Direct contact
transmission occurs when pathogens are transferred from one in-
fected person to another person without a contaminated interme-
diate object or person. Indirect contact transmission involves the
transfer of an infectious agent through a contaminated interme-
diate object or person. Droplet transmission involves respiratory
droplets carrying infectious pathogens that travel directly from
the respiratory tract of the infectious individual to susceptiblemu-
cosal surfaces of the recipient, generally over short distances. Air-
borne transmission occurs by dissemination of either airborne
droplet nuclei or small particles in the respirable size range con-
taining infectious agents that remain infective over time and dis-
tance. In further understanding the complexities of disease trans-
mission, two other terms should be considered. The first is aerosol
transmission, which involves inhalation of infectious aerosols sus-
pended in the air either near a person or at a distance and can
involve aerosol particles of various sizes that either land on mu-
cosal surfaces, such as the nose and mouth, or are inspired deeper
into the respiratory tract (69). Both traditional models of droplet
transmission and airborne transmission can fit under the broader
category of aerosol transmission. Aerosols can be generated from
the respiratory tract, via forceful emission of body fluids such as
Osterholm et al.
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vomitus or diarrhea, or from aerosol-generating procedures. This
leads to the last concept, which is respiratory transmission. Respi-
ratory transmission is limited to generation of aerosols (either
droplet or small-particle aerosols) from the respiratory tract (e.g.,
nasal passages, trachea, or lungs) that then enter the airspace and,
to use the traditionalmodel, cause infection by droplet or airborne
spread.
Breathing, talking, coughing, and sneezing generate particles
suspended in air (aerosols), which range in diameter from less
than 1 m to greater than 100 m. These particles traditionally
have been divided into two categories: droplet and airborne.
Droplets have been thought to range from 5 m to 100 m in
diameter, to travel no more than a few feet, and to be projected
onto surfaces, skin, or mucous membranes. Airborne particles
(often referred to as “droplet nuclei”) have been thought to be less
than 5m, to remain suspended in the air for a period of time, and
to transmit infection by inhalation only at some distance from the
source patient. In the traditional infection control paradigm,
transmission via particles can only occur in two ways: (i) by
large droplets directly impacting skin or mucous membranes
and (ii) by inhalation of small airborne particles at a distance
from the source. Larger particles also may settle on objects,
allowing fomite transmission. This paradigm fails to recognize
that infectious aerosols include suspended particles in a wide
range of particle sizes (small to large droplets) that are easily
inhaled by someone standing near the point of generation.
Thus, aerosol inhalation can occur both near and far from an
infectious source. Distinguishing transmission from droplet
impact on skin or mucous membranes, direct body fluid con-
tact, or inhalation of small-particle aerosols near the source is
not possible without more detailed and careful exposure as-
sessment during epidemiological investigations. Larger parti-
cles can be deposited in the nasal passages, pharynx, and upper
regions of the lungs, while smaller particles are more likely to
be deposited in the alveoli.
We now know that aerosols contain particles of various sizes
and that the traditional model of droplet versus airborne spread is
an oversimplification of a complex process (70, 71). For example,
coughing was thought to produce primarily large droplet-sized
particles (68). Recent data suggest, however, that most particles
produced during coughing are under 1 m and that cough aero-
sols aremultiphased and capable of extended suspension of inhal-
able particles both near and far from a source (72, 73). These
findings are consistent with a review on particle size, which found
that droplets involving respiratory pathogens are a heterogeneous
mix of large and small particles (74). A similar paradigm may be
applied to generation of aerosols outside the respiratory tract,
such as aerosols generated throughmedical procedures or forceful
episodes of vomiting or diarrhea. For example, vomiting associ-
ated with enteric norovirus infection can result in emission of
infectious aerosols that result in transmission (75). In real-world
environments, a number of factors impact the likelihood of aero-
sol transmission, such as the length of time particles reside in the
air, the length of time particles remain infectious once expelled,
variations in particle size and density, and issues such as ambient
temperature and humidity.
In 2004, Roy and Milton proposed classifying aerosol trans-
mission of respiratory pathogens as obligate, preferential, or op-
portunistic, based on the ability of the agent to be transmitted
through small-particle aerosols (76). According to this system,
Mycobacterium tuberculosis is transmitted primarily through
small-particle aerosols and thus involves obligate aerosol trans-
mission. Pathogens with preferential aerosol transmission include
agents such as varicella zoster virus that can be transmitted in
multiple ways but are transmitted primarily by small-particle
aerosols. Pathogens with opportunistic aerosol transmission in-
clude those that are transmitted primarily by other routes but can
be transmitted by small-particle aerosols under certain condi-
tions; as noted above, norovirus is an example. Ebola virus may
also fit into this category, since infectious aerosols (either large or
small droplet), which could result in transmission, may be gener-
ated and emitted during the course of disease.
WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN ABOUT EBOLA VIRUSES
The number of past outbreaks and associated epidemiological
studies carefully examining transmission patterns is small; there-
fore, conclusions about transmission are based on relatively lim-
ited data sets. Furthermore, inferences frompast studies have been
based on retrospective reconstructions of chains of transmission,
and exposure histories were often obtained from surrogates in
situations where cases could not be interviewed; as a result, an
inherent recall bias exists formost of the available epidemiological
studies. Because of limitations in the current data, the role of aero-
sol transmission remains unclear. Transmission potentially oc-
curs via virus-laden aerosols generated through forceful emission
of body fluids during vomiting, diarrhea, or coughing (particu-
larly if hemorrhaging is involved). In support of this, investigators
created Ebola-containing aerosols and, on the basis of decay rates,
estimated that EBOV can survive in aerosols for approximately
100 min and RESTV can survive for approximately 160 min (at
50% to 55% relative humidity and 22  3°C) (31). In addition,
available studies have not been able to effectively tease out expo-
sure via fomites from exposure via direct contact or body fluid
contact; therefore, the epidemiological significance of fomite
transmission also is unknown. Further studies are needed to better
define the potential roles for aerosol and fomite transmission in
spreading disease.
To date, investigators have assumed that EBOV strains are sim-
ilar with regard to infectivity, pathogenicity, and virulence. Past
experience, however, may not necessarily predict future Ebola vi-
rus behavior. Also, we know that the West Africa EBOV strain
represents a unique clade (64), and its full phenotypic range has
not been elucidated. For example, quantitative RT-PCR testing in
2014 of blood specimens from 41 Sierra Leone patients and 23
patients from a concurrent EBOV outbreak in the DRC, which
involved a different EBOV strain, showed significantly lower CT
(cycle threshold) values (indicating higher viral loads) for the Si-
erra Leone patients (mean CT, 22.44  0.90) than for the DRC
patients (mean CT, 30.08  1.23; P  0.0001 by an unpaired
two-tailed t test). The CT value is the cycle number at which the
fluorescence generated within a reaction crosses a predetermined
threshold and is inversely correlated to the amount of target nu-
cleic acid in the sample. The same protocols, reagents, and equip-
ment were used for both sets of specimens, and the time from
illness onset to specimen collection did not differ for the two
groups. These findings suggest that some patients infected with
the West Africa EBOV strain (Makona) have higher viral loads,
which could contribute to transmission and result in more super-
spreading events (G. Kobinger, unpublished data). Furthermore,
limited information is available about Ebola virus evolution dur-
Opinion/Hypothesis
March/April 2015 Volume 6 Issue 2 e00137-15 ® mbio.asm.org 5
 
m
bio.asm
.org
 o
n
 February 26, 2015 - Published by 
m
bio.asm
.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ing serial passage over time, since past outbreaks have involved
relatively few generations of spread. The West Africa epidemic
involvesmany generations of spread, the impact of which remains
unknown.
Several other issues important to transmission and outbreak
propagation deserve mention. First, in explosive situations
such as the current epidemic, we do not know the potential role
of superspreading events. Such events may often be explained
by epidemiological or behavioral factors such as association
with ritual burials; however, other possible explanations de-
serve further investigation. It could be, as suggested by phylo-
dynamic modeling, that superspreading events have played an
important role in transmission dynamics in West Africa. Sec-
ond, limited data are available on environmental survival of
Ebola viruses. Third, we know that in the vast majority of cases,
infected persons do not transmit the virus in the absence of
symptoms, likely because of low viral shedding; however, ad-
ditional data are needed to further refine the onset of infec-
tiousness. Fourth, we know that the virus can be shed for sev-
eral months following recovery, but the epidemiological
significance of this remains unknown. Finally, in such a large
epidemic as the one in West Africa, we do not know if trans-
mission is amplified by sylvatic or domestic animal popula-
tions at the human-animal interface.
RESPIRATORY TRANSMISSION OF EBOLA VIRUSES: A
HYPOTHESIS
It is very likely that at least some degree of Ebola virus transmis-
sion currently occurs via infectious aerosols generated from the
gastrointestinal tract, the respiratory tract, ormedical procedures,
although this has been difficult to definitively demonstrate or rule
out, since those exposed to infectious aerosols also are most likely
to be in close proximity to and in direct contact with an infected
case. To date, investigators have not identified respiratory spread
(either via large droplets or small-particle aerosols) of Ebola vi-
ruses among humans. This could be because such transmission
does not occur or because such transmission has not been recog-
nized, since the number of studies that have carefully examined
transmission patterns is small.
Despite the lack of supportive epidemiological data, a key ad-
ditional question to ask is whether primary pulmonary infections
and respiratory transmission of Ebola viruses could be a potential
scenario for the future. A fair amount of evidence suggests that
such transmission could be possible, even without dramatic evo-
lution or genetic changes in Ebola viruses (although viral evolu-
tion over time could enhance this possibility). First, Ebola viruses
can be isolated from saliva, and viral particles have been identified
in pulmonary alveoli on human autopsies, suggesting that infec-
tious aerosols could be emitted from the respiratory tract. Second,
Ebola viruses can infect several cell types found in the respiratory
tract, including macrophages and epithelial cells (77). Third,
cough can be a symptom of EVD, and coughing is known to gen-
erate aerosols, although prevalence of reported cough is variable
in case series (ranging from “rare” to 49%) (2, 6, 78). Fourth,
animal studies indicate that EBOV can be transmitted through
aerosols and that respiratory infection with pneumonitis can oc-
cur following this route of inoculation. Fifth, experience with
RESTV suggests that respiratory transmission of that species can
occur between animals and possibly from animals to humans.
Finally, people can generate and emit aerosols with particles of
various sizes, including fine particles, which could enter the lower
respiratory tract and infect susceptible cells; Ebola virus is in the
respirable range (800 to 1,000 nm).
If aerosols containing Ebola virus were to enter the lungs of
uninfected individuals, it is possible that primary pulmonary in-
fections could occur (as shown in animal studies), which could
then result in active viral shedding from the respiratory tract, thus
potentially setting up a cycle of ongoing respiratory transmission
in humans (79), similar to what occurs during outbreaks of pneu-
monic plague. Investigators of a nosocomial outbreak of Lassa
fever virus, another African hemorrhagic fever virus that is usually
spread via contact with rodents (especially rodent urine), postu-
lated that transmission may have occurred through the respira-
tory route (80, 81). Similarly, investigators of a nosocomial cluster
of Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, a vector-borne infection
that occurs in Eastern Europe and Africa, identified probable
aerosol transmission due to aerosol-generating medical proce-
dures (82). Experts in bioterrorism have long been concerned that
hemorrhagic fever viruses, particularly filoviruses (Ebola virus
and Marburg virus), could be used as potential agents of bioter-
rorism, with an aerosol being the most likely form of dissemina-
tion (83, 84). This concern has been grounded in uncertainty con-
cerning the potential for aerosol transmission of such viruses. A
strain of Marburg virus was weaponized by the Soviet Union,
highlighting this risk (58).
Leading public health agencies have stated that airborne trans-
mission (i.e., transmission via small-particle aerosols traveling
over time and distance) of Ebola viruses is unlikely to occur in the
future because thiswould require specific genotypic changes in the
virus (85, 86). We agree this is an improbable (although not im-
possible) scenario; however, with phenotypic changes in the virus,
aerosol transmission (and possibly respiratory transmission if pri-
mary pulmonary infections were to occur) involving droplets of
various sizes from cases in relatively close proximity to uninfected
persons remains plausible. The West Africa Ebola epidemic sur-
prised even themost astute infectious disease experts in the global
public health community; we should not assume that Ebola vi-
ruses are not capable of surprising us again at some point in the
future.
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